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Abstract- The analysis of system calls is one method em-
ployed by anomaly detection systems to recognise mali-
cious code execution. Similarities can be drawn between
this process and the behaviour of certain cells belong-
ing to the human immune system, and can be applied
to construct an artificial immune system. A recently
developed hypothesis in immunology, the Danger The-
ory, states that our immune system responds to the pres-
ence of intruders through sensingmolecules belonging to
those invaders, plus signals generated by the host indic-
ating danger and damage. We propose the incorporation
of this concept into a responsive intrusion detection sys-
tem, where behavioural information of the system and
running processes is combined with information regard-
ing individual system calls.
1 Introduction
Malicious code execution through the exploitation of soft-
ware vulnerabilities can allow an intruder to compromise
a host running the software. The running of any process
on a machine generates system calls, providing interaction
between application, operating system and hardware. Ana-
lysis of the system calls made by a process, through the
verification of system call usage, can reveal the execution
of malicious code. Previous research attempted to identify
the exploitation vulnerable software by detecting anomalies
present in system call (‘syscall’) traces [hofm98][krug03].
Research in this area frequently utilises the construction of
system call profiles during the legitimate operation of mon-
itored programs. During the detection process, any syscall
sequences or arguments that do not comply with the pre-
viously generated ‘normal’ profiles are regarded as a sign
that the system is compromised. Although these approaches
have produced promising results, they can produce high
rates of false positive errors, an issue which has yet to be
resolved. As outlined in [tan02], this may arise from the
fact that the environment comprising the ‘system’ is largely
ignored
The key objective of our work is to propose a solution to
this problem by taking inspiration from the Human Immune
System (HIS). A hotly debated hypothesis in immunology,
known as the Danger Theory [matz94][matz02] illustrates
that the HIS can detect danger in addition to the collection
of proteins known as antigens in order to trigger appropri-
ate immune responses. Similarly, in the case of utilising sy-
scalls to detect malicious code execution, we argue that the
presentation of data must be coupled with its environmental
conditions to create a sense of context.
Previous research into computer security within the bio-
logically inspired field of Artificial Immune Systems (AIS)
has focused on detecting intrusions through the use of al-
gorithms based on the self-nonself theory of immunogen-
icity. This theory dictates that the immune system is ac-
tivated by the presence of ‘non-self’ or foreign proteins,
and is a prevalent hypothesis in immunology[aick04]. How-
ever, there are numerous instances where this classification
fails. For instance, there is no immune response to foreign
bacteria in the gut or to food and conversely, some auto-
reactive processes exist, causing diseases such as rheum-
atoid arthritis and multiple sclerosis. The Danger The-
ory challenges this viewpoint, arguing that foreign invaders
cause damage to the host, thus inducing the release of cell
molecules (termed danger signals) by detecting cell stress
and death[matz94]. These signals are exposed to antigen
presenting cells, which in turn initiate immune responses,
due to the correlation of the signals. Similarly, we propose
a system which encompasses various features of the danger
theory to provide context to existing system call data, and
generating an appropriate response.
2 Approach
2.1 Dendritic Cells and Danger Signals
Dendritic cells (DCs) are ‘professional’ antigen presenting
cells, specialised for presenting collected proteins (antigen)
in combination with their environmental context. This in-
formation is presented to effector T cells [manf02], causing
the recognition and removal of pathogens. Following mi-
gration to the lymph node, antigen is displayed with con-
text signals by DCs, which can activate ‘naive’ T cells. T
cells expressing a complimentary receptor for the antigen
are activated if presented in a dangerous or ‘necrotic’ con-
text. Conversely, a safe or ‘apoptotic’ context causes any
matching T cells become tolerised to that particular protein.
The context information is translated using the differen-
tiation pathways of the DCs. DCs exist in three matura-
tion states: immature(iDC), semi-mature (smDC) and ma-
ture (mDC). Initially, when a DC enters the tissue, it exists
in an immature state. The function of an iDC is to collect
cellular debris from the tissue via ingestion. Debris com-
prising of protein is extracted and stored, in preparation for
presentation. However, presentation of antigen to T cells via
iDCs results in the deactivation of the T cell, as it does not
express the necessary costimulatory molecules or inflam-
matory cytokines (local chemical messengers) required for
full T cell activation.
However, if the tissue is damaged as a result of a patho-
genic infection or other cell stress, ‘danger signals’ are re-
leased into the tissue. Additionally, pathogens like bacteria
express proteins which can be recognised through specific
receptors (pattern recognition receptors) on DCs, which
have evolved over millions of years and are highly con-
served. These pathogenic proteins are known as patho-
gen associated molecular patterns (PAMPs). Exposure to
PAMPS, danger signals or both, causes the full maturation
of an iDC, initiating migration out of the tissue to the lymph
node. On disruption of the membrane, a cell undergoes lysis
and releases all of its contents into the surrounding area. A
number of molecules found only inside of cells, such as uric
acid, appear in the interstitial fluid. The signals are an in-
dicator of cell stress, implying danger is present within that
particular tissue. Inflammatory cytokines produced by other
mDCs in the area can have an amplicative effect on both the
PAMPs and danger signals. The cellular effects of exposure
to PAMPS and danger signals result in increased production
of the costimulatory molecules necessary for T cell bind-
ing, and the expression of cytokines which activate naive T
cells. This can lead to a full adaptive immune response.
Conversely, if the tissue is healthy and the cells are not
under stress, apoptosis is the dominant kind of cell death,
resulting in the regulated dismantling of the cell. This en-
sures that the cell contents are disposed without entering
the interstitial fluid. The presence of cytokines released as
a result of apoptosis, bind to different receptors on the DC,
again, modifying the output cytokines expressed. This res-
ults in the increased production of the costimulatory mo-
lecules (as with the mDC), but the increased production of
different cytokines. The cytokines released by the so called
’semi-mature’ DCs are thought to tolerise T-cells to the anti-
gen presented, and to produce regulatory T-cells which also
have a suppressive effect.
Essentially, DCs have the capacity to act as biological
anomaly detectors [gree05]. They combine multiple signal
inputs (in the form of PAMPs, danger signals, inflammatory
cytokines and apoptotic signals), process volumes of anti-
gen and provide T cells with essential context information
regarding the health of the tissue. An abstracted model of
these cells forms the basis of the anomaly detection com-
ponent of our system, given their ability as natural danger
detectors. In order to apply a dendritic cell inspired al-
gorithm for the detection of malicious code execution, a
suitable mapping for antigen and signals must be formu-
lated.
Each DC is programmed with a simple multi-signal pro-
cessor and antigen collector function. The signals represent
the context for the collected antigen1, and a unique signal
mapping schema is applied. PAMPS are represented by vi-
olations of security policies created by a system call checker
such as systrace [prov03]. These are signature based sig-
nals, like proteins that we know to come from pathogenic
sources. The danger signals represent the behaviour of
the process, with deviations in the behaviour increasing the
level of danger within the system. Conversely, the continu-
ous normal behaviour of the processes generates safe sig-
1The details of an antigen used by the AIS are discussed in section 2.2.
nals. Inflammatory cytokines are not enough to initiate full
DC maturation, but give an indication of the health of the
tissue, and therefore can be mapped to examining the gen-
eral behaviour of the host machine. Specific examples and
a summary of the four types of signal are provided in Table
1.
Signals Meaning Examples
PAMP known to be
pathogenic
Security policy
violation
Safe Signals indicates
stable/normal
conditions
No de-
tectable change in
process cpu load or
memory usage
Danger
Signals
may indic-
ate changes in
behaviour
Highly fluctuat-
ing process cpu or
memory usage
Inflammatory
Cytokines
amplify
the effects of the
other signals
System load
average
Table 1: Signals provided for malicious process detection
The data comprising the ’antigen’ and ‘signals’ are cap-
tured and stored ready for collection by a subset of the DC
population. The signals are received and stored for collec-
tion at various concentrations, relative to the level of devi-
ation. Virtual output cytokines derived through combining
the inputs are used to direct our response-generating T cells.
The virtual DCs have three types of output cytokine con-
centrations: costimulatory molecules (CSM), mature cy-
tokines and semi-mature cytokines. High concentrations of
PAMPs and danger signals lead to a high expression of ma-
ture cytokines, which can be further amplified in value by
the addition of inflammatory cytokines. Conversely, the ap-
optotic signals are used to increase semi-mature cytokine
expression, and to suppress the effects of PAMPs. The re-
ceipt of any kind of signal results in an increased level of
CSM expression. Once the concentration of CSM reaches
a threshold, the DC can collect no more antigen or signals,
and is removed from the tissue and sent to the lymph node.
2.2 Antigens and T cell Maturation
In an immunological context, antigens are defined as
substances which can initiate adaptive immune responses
[coic03]. When applied to our system, the execution of a
program - a process, can be regarded as a collection of anti-
gens. Should the program be exploited, this will change the
expected behaviour of the process. Once this is detected by
the DC population, the T cell component of the system must
respond accordingly - delaying or stopping the execution of
the malicious code. Therefore, system calls comprising the
process being exploited can be viewed as antigens, and have
the capacity to stimulate an active response. As a running
process generates a large number of system calls, antigens
are a subset of the total syscalls executed.
Our system captures antigens (sets of syscalls) by us-
ing a system call policy checker tool, systrace [syst03] .
These antigens are further fragmented by the DC popula-
tion, forming antigen-peptides, a further subset of the total
syscalls for a scrutinised executable. Various sets of anti-
gen peptide can be extracted from an antigen multiple times,
by multiple DC. This is both in terms of different sequence
lengths and sampling rates. Hence, a population of DCs
present a set of system calls in diverse forms together with
antigen contexts, which are represented by output cytokine
concentrations.
In the HIS, DCs interact with naive T cells which have
the capacity to differentiate further into effector T cells
[coic03]. Naive T cells are newly created cells which have
not encountered antigen and do not yet exhibit immune re-
sponse functions, such as cell destroying abilities. They
have a specialised receptors type called TCRs which vary
greatly between T cells. This receptor facilitates the bind-
ing between the TCR and presented antigen peptides. Naive
T cells are activated when the TCR- antigen peptide bind-
ing affinity is sufficiently high and the necessary CSMs and
cytokines are present in large enough concentrations. The
activated T cells gain the ability to proliferate and their
clones begin to differentiate into effector T cells. These
cells present in distressed or inflamed tissues recognise in-
fected cells by binding their TCRs to pathogenic antigen
peptides on target cell surfaces.
In the AIS, naive T cells are generated when smDCs
or mDCs carry antigen peptides to artificial lymph nodes.
TCRs of naive T cells are created by randomly sampling,
combining and generalising the antigen peptides passed
from the DCs. Specifically, different combinations of sy-
scall sequences and partial strings of syscall arguments be-
come TCRs of naive T cells, which can be signatures of an
on-going attack. Our AIS uses an individual policy state-
ment, which is generated by systrace, to represent TCRs
of naive T cells. Systrace itself monitors system calls pro-
duced by a running program and it forces actions such as
denying or permitting system calls based on a pre-defined
policy [prov03]. The system call policy consists of a num-
ber of policy statements, which have a ‘condition’ part de-
scribing the states of monitored system calls and an ‘action’
part addressing actions to be taken when the condition part
is observed. We define the condition part of the individual
policy statement as the TCR, and the action portion as vari-
ous types of computer immune responses.
In order for naive T cells to acquire activation, they
constantly interact with smDCs and mDCs present in the
lymph nodes. Whenever DCs interact with naive T cells,
the presented antigen peptides are evaluated based on sat-
isfactory matching with the TCRs (the condition parts of
individual policy statements) of the selected T cell. Fol-
lowing a successful match, the three output cytokine con-
centrations of the presenting DC are examined. Naive T
cells interpret three categories of DC output cytokines. High
concentrations of mDC cytokines are translated attack as-
sociated antigens, with high concentrations of semi-mature
cytokines indicating normal system function. Additionally,
the value of expressed CSM indicates that the DC has been
exposed to sufficient signals to permit presentation. Hence,
if single antigens are captured at regular time intervals, the
CSM value indicates that the output cytokines are accumu-
lated over a long period time. This kind of information can
provide more fine-grained evidence to support the decisions
made over the generation of the appropriate response, per-
haps giving rise to fewer false positives. Naive T cells have
two numerical values called activation values and tolerance
values that reflect the accumulated results of DC output cy-
tokine concentration examination. These values indicate the
state of naive T cell maturation. Upon this value reaching a
pre-defined threshold, naive T cells finally become effector
T cells. The activation and tolerance values are increased by
the mDC and smDC cytokine concentrations respectively.
2.3 T cell Differentiation and Responses
Whenever naive T cells are created, they are assigned a
lifespan and an age. The lifespan indicates the maximum
period of timesteps which the naive T cells can survive and
interact with DCs, and the age represents the length of the T
cell-DC interaction. When the activation or tolerance values
of the naive T cells exceed the predefined thresholds before
their ages reach the lifespans, the naive T cells become ef-
fector T cells. If the threshold is not reached the T cells
are subject to permanent deletion. This acts to safeguard
against a number of false positive and negative errors, that
could arise as a result of over-generalisation on behalf of the
T cell.
The type of response generated by the effector T-cell is
dependent on which value reaches the threshold first. The
allotted responses of the effector T cells are presented by
the ‘action’ parts of the system call policy statements, pre-
viously used to represent the TCRs. If the activation value
triggers T-cell differentiation, a ‘deny’ action is given as the
response of the effector T cell. A ‘permit’ response is gen-
erated if differentiation does not occur. The effector T cells
with TCRs and associated responses start monitoring new
system call traces. Whenever new system calls satisfy the
TCRs of effector T cells, the AIS takes the actions which are
presented as the responses of the effector T cells. Two types
of responses can be generated - system call permission and
denial, both implemented using systrace.
In order to maintain a sense of homeostasis, effector
T-cells have a controlled lifespan in addition to naive T-
cells. New system call policies presented by newly differen-
tiated effector T cells are applied only during their restricted
lifespan. However, a subset of these effector T cells, ap-
propriately termed memory T cells, can remain for a longer
period of time than the initially defined lifespan. In the HIS,
the approximately 90 percent of effector cells die after their
responses or lifespans, the rest remain as memory [coic03].
Memory T cells are known to have an increased capacity for
survival. Many factors contribute to the generation of ‘ef-
fector memory’, with the exact biological mechanism still
to be determined. For our AIS, we are also currently ex-
amining a number of possible immunological mechanisms
which explains the memory T cell pool maintenance, and
evaluating whether any of these explanations might provide
a way to maintain memory effector T cells.
3 Conclusion
This paper introduces a novel artificial immune system that
detects malicious code execution and responds appropri-
ately. The illustrated system implements various immun-
ological mechanisms that are principally explained by the
Danger Theory. The key assumption that our system at-
tempts to verify is that our AIS is able to i) detect a danger
from environmental conditions, ii) extracts and generalises
attack signatures from the data associated with the detected
danger, and iii) hence responds to an on-going attack appro-
priately.
The implementation of such a system has been progress-
ing using systrace, which is a system call policy checker.
Various signals describing the behaviours of monitored pro-
cesses and hosts are processed by a population of dendritic
cells (DCs). The processed signals coupled with antigens
(sets of system calls) are presented to naive T cells. Three
groups of signal processing outcomes lead naive T cells to
differentiate to effector T cells, presenting attack signatures
and a selected response, to permit or deny a system call.
Whilst the proposed system automatically updates the
system call policy of systrace as a result of artificial immune
responses, it does not aim to oppose the manual policy gen-
eration method currently used by systrace. Instead, our sys-
tem is designed to extend an initial policy which is construc-
ted defined by a user. There are already available publically-
audited policies, including the Hairy Eyeball project. This
project introduces systrace policies of nearly two hundred
vulnerable programs [hair]. It is very common for a user to
re-use these policies in order to save their time or select rel-
atively reliable choices of policies. However, these policies
do not cover all malicious or benign system calls regard-
less of whether they are manually predefined by a user, or
reconfigured from publically-audited policies.
Currently systrace adopts two modes to handle system
calls which do not match any policy statements. The user
is asked to decide whether to deny or permit a system
call. During this process the monitored program pauses un-
til a decision is received, with the appropriate action then
taken. In contrast, the artificial immune responses initiated
by our system are expected to handle this situation auto-
matically. The long hours of user absence or default denial
can cause unnecessary program halt. In addition, the ad-
opting publicly-audited policies requires some reconfigura-
tion of the policies to ensure suitability in the new environ-
ment. Artificial immune responses controlled by our system
would be able to automate the reconfiguration of publically-
audited policies. Similarly, our system would allow an auto-
mated update of policies in line with changes in the local
computing environment.
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